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Image signing
Signing container images so a cluster only runs ones your pipeline produced.
What it means
Image signing means attaching a digital signature to a container image when your pipeline builds it. Later, anything that wants to run the image can check the signature against a public key or an identity you trust.
A valid signature says the image came from a signer you recognise and has not changed since. It does not say the image is free of flaws. It answers where it came from, not whether it is good.
Why it matters
A registry or a build system can be tampered with. If someone replaces an image with a poisoned one, or a stolen credential pushes an image under a trusted name, an unsigned cluster will run it without question.
Signing is a defence against the kind of break-in described in supply chain attacks. It also gives customers who ask how you know what you deploy a concrete answer.
How it shows up
Tools such as Sigstore's cosign sign images in the pipeline and store the signature beside the image in the registry. Signing alone does nothing. The value comes from enforcement: an admission controller in the cluster rejects images without a valid signature.
Common gaps are signing but never verifying, trusting any signature rather than your pipeline's identity, and signing by tag instead of by digest. Protect the signing keys or use keyless signing tied to your build identity, and pair signing with build provenance.
Questions people ask
Image signing, answered
Does a signed image mean a safe image?
No. It means the image is from your signer and unchanged. It may still contain vulnerable packages or bad code.
What is cosign?
Cosign is a tool from the Sigstore project for signing and verifying container images and other artifacts.
Who verifies the signature?
An admission controller or policy engine in the cluster, or a step in your deploy pipeline. If nobody verifies, signing adds little.
Why sign by digest?
A tag can point to different content later. A digest names exact content, so the signature refers to what you built.
What if the signing key is stolen?
An attacker can sign bad images. Keep keys in a protected store, or use short-lived keyless signing, and rotate if exposed.
Sources
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Related
Terms that sit next to this one
Digital signature
A value that proves who produced data and that it has not changed since.
Code signing
Signing software so users and systems can check who released it and that it is intact.
Container registry
The store that holds your images, which needs its own access control.
Admission controller
A cluster gate that can reject workloads breaking your security rules.
Build provenance
A signed record of where, when and how a piece of software was built.
Who built the image you run?
We test the application you deploy and prove each finding with the exact request. Ask us to run it on one of your applications.
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