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Password spraying
Trying a few common passwords across many accounts to stay under lockout limits.
What it means
Password spraying is a guessing attack that turns normal brute force around. Instead of trying thousands of passwords against one account, the attacker tries one or two very common passwords, such as a season and a year, against hundreds or thousands of accounts.
Because each account sees only one or two failed attempts, the usual per-account lockout never triggers. The attacker is counting on the fact that in any large group of people, a few will have picked an easy password. That is why the technique is patient, quiet and low in volume.
Why it matters
It works against the places where an account is already worth having: staff sign-in pages, customer portals and anything exposed to the internet. One success is enough for a foothold, and from there an attacker can read data or try lateral movement. It is catalogued by MITRE as ATT&CK technique T1110.003.
It also exposes how much you rely on account lockout. A control that watches each account alone cannot see a pattern that spans the whole user base. The signal is in the spread: many accounts failing once each, from a small set of sources.
How it shows up
You meet it in sign-in logs as a long run of failures for different usernames, often in an alphabetical list or at a slow, steady pace. Defences are a strong password policy that rejects common passwords, multi-factor sign-in, and rate limits that count across accounts by source, not only per account.
Look at every place that accepts a password, since attackers pick the least guarded one, often an old protocol, a mobile endpoint or a forgotten admin page. Make sure failed sign-ins are logged with account, source and time so that a pattern across accounts can be found.
Questions people ask
Password spraying, answered
How is password spraying different from credential stuffing?
Spraying guesses common passwords against many accounts. Credential stuffing tries real username and password pairs leaked from other breaches. The defences overlap, but the signals in the logs differ.
Why does lockout not stop it?
Each account sees only a failed attempt or two, well below any lock threshold. The attacker waits between rounds so that the total rate also looks low.
Does multi-factor authentication stop it?
It stops a guessed password from being enough on its own. The attacker may still learn that a password is valid, so protect every route, including those that skip the second factor.
How do we detect it?
Alert on many different accounts failing from one source or network, and on one account failing from many sources. Per-account alerts alone will miss it.
What passwords do attackers try?
Short, predictable ones: a season and year, the company name with a number, or a common word with an exclamation mark. Screening new passwords against breached and common lists removes most of them.
Sources
Where this comes from
Related
Terms that sit next to this one
Brute force
Trying passwords or codes over and over until one of them works.
Credential stuffing
Trying passwords leaked elsewhere, because people reuse them.
Account lockout
Blocking an account after repeated failed sign-ins, and the denial it can cause.
Password policy
The rules on length, reuse and checking that decide which passwords you accept.
MFA
A second proof beyond the password, usually a code or a hardware key.
What would many failures look like?
We test sign-in routes on the running app for weak limits, missing second factors and guessable accounts, and each finding carries the request and response that proved it. Book a pilot on one app.
Or start with a $199 pilot on one application: thirty days, success criteria agreed before day one, credited against the annual if you convert.