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SIM swap
Taking over a phone number so text-message codes reach the attacker instead.
What it means
A SIM swap is a fraud where an attacker persuades a mobile carrier to move a victim's phone number onto a SIM card the attacker holds. The tricks used include impersonating the owner, bribing staff or abusing weak identity checks at a shop or call centre.
From that moment, calls and text messages for that number reach the attacker. Any service that sends a sign-in code or a reset link by SMS is now sending it to the wrong person. The victim often notices only when their phone suddenly loses signal, by which time the codes have already been used.
Why it matters
It turns the phone number into the key to the account. An attacker who already has a password, perhaps from a data breach, can pass a text-message second factor and take the account in minutes. Banks, crypto services and email accounts are common targets.
You cannot fix the carrier, but you choose what your app trusts. NIST's guidance treats codes sent over the phone network as a restricted authenticator, to be offered with care and with alternatives, and asks services to check for recent changes to a number.
How it shows up
You meet it wherever SMS is used: sign-in codes, account recovery, high-value approvals and phone-number-based login. Check whether a number change on the account alone, without other proof, can reset access, and whether you notify the old email address when a number is added or changed.
Safer choices are an authenticator app, a security key or passkeys. Where SMS has to stay, add limits, alerts and a delay on sensitive changes soon after a number moves. Do not let SMS be the only route back into an account that holds money or customer data.
Questions people ask
SIM swap, answered
Is a SIM swap the same as SIM cloning?
No. A swap persuades the carrier to move the number to a new SIM. Cloning copies the data of the original SIM. The result for the victim, losing control of their number, is similar.
Is SMS-based authentication still acceptable?
It is better than a password alone, but weaker than an app, a key or a passkey. NIST classes it as restricted, so it should be one option, not the only one, for sensitive accounts.
How would we know if a customer was SIM swapped?
You usually would not, from your side alone. Signals include a sudden sign-in from a new device soon after an SMS code, or a number change followed by a high-value action.
What can our app do about it?
Offer stronger factors, avoid SMS-only recovery, add a waiting period or extra checks after contact details change, and alert the customer through a second channel.
Does it matter for our staff accounts too?
Yes. Staff who use text messages for sign-in on email, cloud and admin tools are as exposed as customers, and a taken-over staff account can do far more damage.
Related
Terms that sit next to this one
MFA
A second proof beyond the password, usually a code or a hardware key.
Credential recovery
The ways a locked-out user gets back in, which are often the weakest door.
Account takeover
An attacker ends up signed in as one of your real users.
Passkeys
Phishing-resistant sign-in using a key on your device instead of a password.
TOTP
The six-digit code from an authenticator app, changing every thirty seconds.
Is SMS your only way back in?
Recovery and second-factor flows are tested on the running app for ways around them, and each finding carries the request and response that proved it. Ask us to run it on one of your applications.
Or start with a $199 pilot on one application: thirty days, success criteria agreed before day one, credited against the annual if you convert.